Nutzungsbedingungen
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN A WORLD OF IDEAS: THE US AND THE LEADING EUROPEAN COUNTRIES Introduction
With the introduction of an ideas function, Paul Romer started an interesting new line of research in economic growth models (Romer, 1990) . After some useful changes in
Romer's original specification to make it more generally applicable, Charles Jones performed a growth accounting exercise for the US economy along the period that contained at least two innovative contributions (Jones, 2002) . The first was to relate Solow's residual path in the US to the number of scientists and technicians in the five countries concentrating the main weight of world tech´s innovation (US, UK, Germany, France and Japan, a group defined by the above-mentioned author as G-5).
The second was to distinguish between the part of the residual that can be attributed to the increase of population in a stationary state (and consequently the number of scientists and technicians, which is assumed to increase proportionally) and the part that can be assigned to the transition towards such a state.
Considering this line of research to be of great interest, we extend here the application of Romer´s and Jones´ ideas functions specifications to the three European Countries integrating the G-5 Group, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, trying to offer a explanation of the evolution of the aggregate multifactor productivity in them.
However, as these economies are technologically dependent to a certain extent, at least from the US, our purpose require mainly to focus in the mechanisms that capture the international dissemination of scientific knowledge as much as this proposed by Jones seems too simple even for the technologically more independent economies as it is that of the US. In fact, we show that the introduction of a catching-up process to a technological frontier improves the model for the European economies. The convenience of such an approach was already suggested years ago by Nelson and Phelps (1966) and more recently by Barro and Sala i Martin (1997) and either have implicit or explicitly been assumed in the empirical works by Coe and Helpman (1995) , De La Fuente (1995) , Engelbrecht (1997) or Bils and Klenow (2000) . Therefore, in the following pages we first expose and apply to Germany, France and the United Kigdom Romer´s and Jones´ ideas function specifications to afterward propose and estimate a new one which introduce a catching up process in technological knowledge.
Technical progress and scientific knowledge in the leading European countries compared to the US.
Jones´ generalization of the ideas function originally proposed by Romer adopts the following form in its discrete time version (Jones, 1995 (Jones, , 2002 :
Where A is the ideas stock, H A is the world research effort in the production of A, and is a parameter to measure the degree of dissemination. Jones (2002) approaches the value A t through the observed multi-factor productivity (TFP)   1 and H A as the sum of the number of researchers in the G-5 countries, assuming that the human capital they embody is the same in all those countries.
To be able to carry out the OLS estimation, expressing A in a more handled way, and , it is even more so in the case of the US, the leading generator of ideas within 3 The detailed results are available from the authors upon request. [ Table 2 ]
The conclusion seems clear: the mechanism for the international dissemination of ideas considered by the reference model is not suitable even for the leading country.
Therefore, if this deficiency was overcome the model would be capable of providing better results, above all when technologically dependent European countries are concerned. We try to do this in the following section.
But, before coming to that, we feel it would be helpful to illustrate the technological backwardness of European countries through Figure 1 , which registers "research intensity" in each country, defined as the proportion of scientists and technicians in relation to total employment. Only recently have Germany and France approached the levels reached by the ratio quoted for the US, to a large degree as a consequence of the latter's very appreciable slowdown in growth from the mid-1960s onwards.
Nevertheless, in the 1990s the United States once again leapt ahead of the technological leaders of Europe in this area. But even if the ratios displayed by the US and Europe had been closer, it seems undeniable that, just as the models by Romer and Jones suppose, the volume of new ideas depends on the number of scientists, not merely on their proportion of the working population.
[ Figure 1 ]
It is also interesting to point out that the variable employed here to measure the R&D activity, the number of researchers, H At , seems to be very close in its time evolution to another more commonly chosen, the stock of technological capital 4 . To verify this, we took the calculations of this last mentioned variable by Martín and Velázquez (2001) , arrived at using real R&D expenditure and the permanent inventory method, assuming a given rate of depreciation. Then we calculated the technological capital indicator per
4 Bönte (2003) shows that a long run relation between productivity and R&D capital stock exists in the US economy. Nevertheless, through an application to the Italian economy, Atella and Quintieri (2001) show that this relationship depend on the measures of Solow´s residual and on the aggregation level of the analysis. [ Figure 2 ]
What proves surprising about the indicator constructed for technological capital per worker is that it registers lower values for the US and UK than for Germany and France, perhaps due to differences in the relative wages of researchers measured in common currency. Actually, such result seems to encourage the use of the number of researchers as indicator of the dimension of R&D activities, particularly in international comparisons.
A technological frontier convergence model for the leading European countries
On the basis of the aforementioned research works on technological international spillovers, a more general model may be formulated for any technologically dependent country, taking one country or a group of leading countries as the technological frontier, l.
where the increase of ideas stock for the technologically dependent country during the period t+1 depends on its value in t and on the value in that same year of the ideas stock of the country considered to be on the technological frontier, l, as well as the number of researchers H A in the country in time t. Following Jones´ intuition, in expression [4] we do not impose constant returns to scale in the ideas stocks. To do that we would have to make =1. In our estimates, we explore the importance of such restriction.
If the country being studied is also the leader in technology, i.e. if it is the l country, the previous expression is simplified and becomes transformed as follows: Table 3 offers the first set of estimations for Germany, France and the United Kingdom, assuming that the US defines the technological frontier they tend towards. The estimation is made jointly for them all, using the SUR method, testing the introduction of different restrictions on the parameters. Constant returns to scale in the foreign stock of ideas are assumed at this first stage.
[ Table 3 ]
The first estimation, in which a common is imposed and for the catch-up coefficient, However, the estimates forecast higher TFP than that registered for recent years, leading us to think that perhaps the model performs better avoiding the restriction of constant returns of scale, following Jones´ intuition. Nevertheless, when we approach the value of 1, using the residuals of the estimations already made, we get a negative and significant value for it only in the case of Germany, as shown in table 4. The estimate for that country is also robust to autocorrelation, following the standard Rao test for an error component model (Bera, Escudero and Yoon, 2000) . Anyway, the value obtained for Germany is very small, possibly indicating that could be close to 1.
[ to do so. This might, however, be because barriers to the entry of foreign technologies have tended to be on the rise in both countries, as Prescott (1993, 2000) suggest, even more than in the United Kingdom where less barriers would have been kept permanently.
[ Figure 3 ]
The conclusion is that the ideas model can be improved in this direction, at least for the technologically dependent countries, or, to put it another way, for all but the US 6 .
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the United States also benefits from ideas created elsewhere, although it is difficult to capture this effect at an empirical level, since this demands the calculation of a more complex technological frontier, a combination of various countries. In fact, this might be the reason for the limited explanatory capacity of the model, highlighted in the obtained R 2 , though that in itself does not detract from the positive features of this specification, about which we offer more arguments below.
Conclusions
In this paper we have discussed some of the results that emerge from the ideas production model that was originally formulated by Romer (1990) , then generalized by Jones (1995) and later used by the same author to explain the behavior of TFP in the US (Jones, 2002) . We have analyzed the application of the model to the countries at the forefront of technological research in Europe, i.e. Germany, France and the UK, as well as to the US for a longer time period than that considered by Jones. We point out that Jones' empirical approach to capturing the international dissemination of ideas can be improved, as the TFP is completely dependent on each country's own scientists, both in Europe and in the US. Explicit consideration of the international circulation of ideas must involve the introduction of catch-up mechanisms in relation to a technological frontier. When this is done, the model seems to perform better and we observe that there is a process of convergence towards the technological frontier. In the explanation of the TFP evolution of some leading European countries, we have approached the distinction between the domestic creation of ideas from the capture of foreign ones. We have also made a first attempt to isolate the negative effect of the increased stock of ideas on the ability to discover new ones, adding new evidence to 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 • Human Capital. The data for average years of educational training for the population sector over 25 years of age come from De la Fuente and Doménech (2001) and (in the case of Germany) from Barro and Lee (2001) .
• Engineers and Scientists assigned to R+D activities. The source is the same as in Jones (2002), though it was necessary to estimate for 1994-1999 using the exponential smoothing method. For the years prior to 1960, it was assumed that the ratio of "research intensity" for each of the three European countries in relation to the US was the same in 1950 as in 1960. This ratio was interpolated for the intermediate years.
To obtain the number of scientists and technicians a multiplication was made based on employment. , 1950-1960, is the result of deducting the annual variations provided by Maddison (1995b) from the number of people employed in 1960.
• Physical Capital. Fixed capital stock was calculated by means of the perpetual inventory method, obtaining the initial value of capital stock following the approach of Harberger and Wisecarver (1977) . The depreciation rate used was 4 per cent. For the years between 1950 and 1960, the annual variation rates provided by Maddison (1995a) were applied to the value estimated for 1960.
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